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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NEW YORK’S DOCTRINE AND HOW IT CAN IMPROVE 
Steven M. Fink* 
I. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The modern public trust doctrine is over a thousand of years in 
the making and can be traced back to the Roman Institutes of 
Justinian.1  The doctrine initially intended to preserve citizens’ access 
and use of the air, running water, sea and the seashore—all were 
considered to be too valuable to the public to be held as private 
property.2  Book II, Title I of the Institutes of Justinian emphasized the 
public’s need to use these waterways for commerce and transporting 
cargo.3  Moreover, the Institutes accentuated the importance of 
preserving the seashore for the public to allow commuters to stop along 
their voyage and fasten cables to trees as a resting place for their 
cargo.4  This general theory was recognized in England and prohibited 
the King from alienating certain lands that were generally used for 
egress and ingress for fishing, trading and other uses by his subjects.5  
Only Parliament could enlarge or diminish these public rights.6  
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, December 2019; 
B.B.A. Hofstra University, 2016.  I would like to thank the entire Law Review board for their 
assistance with editing this Note, including the Editor-in-Chief, Michael Morales, who 
dedicated much time and effort during the publication stage.  I would also like to especially 
thank Professor Seplowitz for her unparalleled help and support during this entire process.  
This Note is dedicated to the memory of Judge Leon Lazer; he was a true gentleman, and the 
inspiration for this article. (July 4, 1921 - January 17, 2018). 
1 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional 
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 (1989). 
2 JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, Book II ¶¶ 1, 5 (J.B. Motle trans. 1911), at 19, 
http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/digital/CJCiv/JInst.pdf. 
3 Id. ¶ 4 
4 Id. 
5 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in National Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 478 (1970). 
6 Id. 
1
Fink: New York's Public Trust Doctrine
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1202 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
The public trust doctrine was first recognized as United States’ 
common law in the 1892 landmark United States Supreme Court 
decision in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois.7  In that case, the Court 
invalidated an Illinois law that granted the Illinois Central Railroad 
Company title to submerged lands in the Chicago Harbor.8  More 
recently, federal courts have begun demonstrating reluctance to further 
develop the doctrine,9 leaving its application to the states.  In the wake 
of the handful of cases that adjudicated the federal common law 
doctrine, we are left with a federal doctrine that protects navigable-in-
fact waters and the surrounding beds up to the high-water mark, 
holding them in trust for the public’s use for navigation, fishing or 
commerce.10 
Although the federal government began developing a federal 
doctrine in the late 1800s, this area is not preempted—each state has 
the power to adopt and develop its own public trust doctrine,11 
ultimately causing substantial differences in its application among the 
states.  This is further exacerbated by the limited federal precedent on 
this topic.  For example, the courts and legislature in Montana have 
applied the doctrine to protect any surface of water that can be used for 
recreational purposes.12  Other states have extended the doctrine 
beyond just commerce, navigation, and fishing to include open space, 
wildlife habitats, areas used for scientific purposes, hunting, bathing, 
 
7 Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
8 Id. at 433-34. 
9 Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine: 
Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty?, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 53 
(1998); Dist. of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“declin[ing] 
to consider . . . whether the public trust doctrine provides a basis for Air Florida’s liability.”); 
Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that Congress’s 
implementation of 16 U.S.C. § 1 eliminated trust duties as they relate to “National Park System 
management”). 
10 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 387; United States v. Montello, 87 U.S. 430 
(1874).  See infra note 71 and accompanying text for a definition of navigable-in-fact waters. 
11 See, e.g., Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 87-88 (2007); Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust 
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public 
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010). 
12 Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that, 
“under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that 
are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed 
ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes”). 
2
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and swimming.13  Some states have even broadened the doctrine to 
protect wildlife,14 parks15 and the dry sand area of beaches.16  However, 
just because these spaces are protected by the doctrine does not mean 
the government is properly exercising its fiduciary duty to keep them 
open to the public—this is an issue that many face in Nassau County, 
New York.17 
Another difference in the doctrines can be spotted when 
comparing the original thirteen states to those admitted later because 
the former relied substantially on English common law18 while the 
latter relied substantially on the Equal Footing Doctrine.19  The Equal 
Footing Doctrine was created in an attempt to give those later admitted 
states the same rights as the original thirteen;20 however, the original 
thirteen were much less likely to be subject to federal conveyances and 
reservations than the later admitted states21 because many of them were 
originally federal territories.22  This resulted in, for example, several 
Indian tribes owning lands under the Arkansas River in Oklahoma,23 
 
13 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public trust 
doctrine also includes the “right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general 
recreational purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable 
waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes” and that the doctrine must also preserve 
lands to be used for “scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the 
area”); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 
(1988) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not only include navigation and fishing, but 
also extends to “boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes”); 
Menzer v. Vill. of Elkhart Lake, 186 N.W.2d 290, 296 (Wis. 1971) (holding that the Wisconsin 
doctrine also preserves “all public uses of water”).  
14 Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
15 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966); Sierra Club v. 
Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
16 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
17 Paul LaRocco, Taxpayers Bought This Land. But Much of it is Hidden, NEWSDAY (July 
19, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://projects.newsday.com/investigations/nassau-hidden-preserves-
open-spaces/#cobrand-include.  Nassau County owns hundreds of acres of land which is 
supposed to be open for public use; however, it is inaccessible, fenced off or overgrown in 
shrubs.  Id. 
18 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 
11, at 56. 
19 Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm’rs, 85 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1873). 
20 Id. 
21 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 
11, at 66.  
22 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 
11, at 66. 
23 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); United States v. Cherokee 
Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987). 
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and the United States retaining title to the Coeur d’Alene Lake and 
Idaho’s St. Joe River in trust for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.24 
While each state has its own doctrine that may be very 
extensive and vary greatly from its neighbors, this Note will focus on 
New York’s public trust doctrine and will briefly discuss features that 
belong to doctrines of several other states.  Section II will provide a 
brief introduction to the doctrine and how it is generally applied.  
Section III will explore the federal public trust doctrine, and section IV 
will indicate the issues that may arise as a result of the federal 
government’s approach.  Section V will compare the rights reserved 
for New Yorkers to access water held in trust to the rights reserved for 
the citizens of other states.  Section VI will analyze the ability of New 
York to dispose of trust property, as well as the history of judicial 
review of such alienation.  Section VII will survey how certain states 
address pollution and wildlife destruction suits under the public trust 
doctrine and discuss why these claims should not automatically arise 
under the public trust doctrine.  Section VIII will explore how the 
public trust doctrine could cause more harm than good, and section IX 
will discuss how New York’s doctrine is not overly burdensome as 
some may believe.  Ultimately, this Note will conclude that New 
York’s doctrine is moderately more expansive than the federal doctrine 
and does not unreasonably burden the rights of real estate developers 
and riparian landowners.  While New York’s current doctrine is not an 
effective model for other states, it could be with a few minor 
adjustments to further benefit the public. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Each state has its own public trust doctrine that may vary 
drastically in breadth compared to its neighbors; however, one idea 
that remains the same across the country is that the doctrine’s main 
purpose is to protect certain property so people may use and enjoy it.  
Professor Alexandra Klass of the University of Minnesota Law School 
described the public trust doctrine as embodying the idea that certain 
resources, such as tidal and navigable waters and land underneath 
them, are owned by the state with a permanent restriction against 
alienation.25  Professor Klass further explained that “[t]o some, the 
 
24 Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001). 
25 Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating 
Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006). 
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doctrine is a vehicle for public access to water, beaches, or fishing in a 
world otherwise dominated by private ownership.”26  This theory was 
reflected in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision that granted the 
public the right to cross over the dry sand area of a beach that was 
owned by a private entity.27  Others believe that the doctrine is a “check 
on government attempts to give away or sell [certain] . . . resources for 
short-term economic gain.”28  This argument is noted in a 1989 
Vermont Supreme Court decision, which prohibited the sale of 1.1 
miles of land along the City of Burlington’s waterfront because that 
land was subject to the public trust doctrine and, therefore, could not 
be sold.29  Last, the doctrine may be used as “a back-door mechanism 
for judicial taking of private property without just compensation 
through a clever argument that the property was never ‘private’ in the 
first place,”30 and, thus, was never privately owned.  Although the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects the people from the government’s taking one’s 
property for public use without just compensation, the public trust 
doctrine is an exception.31  For example, when an event, such as rising 
sea levels, causes the private property owner’s land to be increasingly 
submerged, it is effectively taken by the government to be held in 
trust.32  This is because states only allow private ownership of lands up 
to a certain point, usually determined by a mean water mark.33  When 
the water levels rise, so do the water marks, ultimately causing the 
landowner’s property ownership to diminish.34  While the government 
may not have actively attempted to take the newly submerged land, the 
 
26 Id. at 699. 
27 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005) 
(holding that the beach association is not permitted to limit the public’s access to the water, 
nor the use of the upland sand for intermittent recreational purposes that are connected to the 
use of the ocean). 
28 Klass, supra note 25, at 699.  
29 State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Vt. 1989). 
30 Klass, supra note 25, at 699. 
31 McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (holding that rising 
water levels create new and additional tidelands which then constitute res in a public trust; 
accordingly, private ownership is diminished in the new tidelands for the benefit of the public).  
32 Id. 
33 Sax, supra note 5, at 476. 
34 Conversely, New Jersey has held that when the dry land area is increased in size as a 
result of a beach replenishment program, the riparian landowner is not afforded any ownership 
interest in such property.  City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 560 (N.J. 2010).  
Accordingly, a riparian landowner’s property ownership is subject to reduction, without the 
possibility of it increasing.  Id. 
5
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public trust doctrine may cause a passive acquisition of the land by the 
government35 without the need to commence a condemnation 
proceeding pursuant to the Takings Clause which states: “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”36  
Ultimately, the government may take land from a private landowner 
and not pay any compensation if the taking is performed pursuant to 
the public trust doctrine. 
Similar to Professor Klass’s idea that the public trust doctrine 
acts as a check on the government from alienating certain resources, 
late Professor Joseph Sax, a highly renowned public trust doctrine 
scholar and author of The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,37 noted that the public trust 
doctrine imposed three major restrictions on the government.38  First, 
when property is subject to a trust, it must not only be used for a public 
purpose, but also be readily available to the general public.39  
Therefore, the resource must be open and accessible to the public and 
any significant restriction on its use would likely be considered an 
unlawful breach of the government’s duty pursuant to the doctrine.40  
Second, “the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash 
equivalent”41 or for a worthy cause without legislative approval.  For 
instance, the New York Court of Appeals decided in 1873 that, without 
legislative approval, protected land could not be used even for a worthy 
cause such as a courthouse or school.42  Last, “the property must be 
maintained for particular types of uses.”43  To further explain this last 
point, Professor Sax indicated that the property or “resource must be 
 
35 Not only is trust res protected against alienation by the doctrine, once a municipality takes 
title to property to be held in its governmental capacity, it cannot be acquired by another even 
through adverse possession.  N.Y.C. v. Sarnelli Bros., Inc., 720 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Div. 
2001). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
37 Sax, supra note 5. 
38 Sax, supra note 5, at 477. 
39 Sax, supra note 5, at 477. 
40 See, e.g., Lake George S.B. Co. v. Blais, 281 N.E.2d 147, 148 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that 
“[i]t has long been the rule that a municipality, without specific legislative sanction, may not 
permit property acquired or held by it for public use to be wholly or partly diverted to a 
possession or use exclusively private.”).  See also State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 561 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that while the resource must be open to the public, the 
government may impose reasonable restrictions on use of the resource such as enacting 
legislation that criminalizes being nude on a beach). 
41 Sax, supra note 5, at 477. 
42 Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920). 
43 Sax, supra note 5, at 477. 
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held available for certain traditional uses, such as navigation, 
recreation, or fishery . . . [or] must be in some sense related to the 
natural uses peculiar to that resource.”44 
These restrictions on alienation have protected property for 
more uses than were initially intended by the Institutes of Justinian, 
such as the New Jersey Supreme Court’s declaration that the doctrine 
must not adhere to “ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but 
[must] extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing, 
swimming and other shore activities.”45  The New Jersey court further 
held that the doctrine should not be “fixed or static, but should be 
molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the 
public it was created to benefit.”46  For example, Mississippi has 
expanded its doctrine to protect commerce, bathing, swimming and 
other recreational activities, development of mineral resources, 
environmental protection and preservation, the enhancement of 
aquatic, avian and marine life, sea agriculture and more.47  However, 
not all states share this view.  For instance, two scholars addressed the 
absence of an effective Nevada doctrine, writing that Nevada simply 
lacks “sufficient public trust statutes to have effected any state-law 
expansions of the doctrine.”48  Another scholar went as far to write, 
“Nevada remains the only western state that has not addressed the 
public trust doctrine.”49  These claims became outdated recently when 
the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged the state’s narrow doctrine 
in a 2011 decision.50 
Regardless of whether a state has a broad doctrine or one that 
was very modestly developed, a plaintiff or petitioner asserting a claim 
arising under the public trust doctrine must have standing to sue, 
otherwise the case will be dismissed.51  In an effort to clarify an earlier 
decision,52 in 1992 the United States Supreme Court created a three-
 
44 Sax, supra note 5, at 477. 
45 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
46 Id. 
47 Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986). 
48 Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 
11, at 70.  
49 John P. Sande, IV, A River Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker Lake?, 
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 833 n.15 (2004). 
50 Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 606-12 (Nev. 2011) (holding that the public trust 
doctrine “requires the state to serve as trustee for public resources”). 
51 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
52 See generally id. 
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prong test to determine standing.53  The initial burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff, who must prove satisfaction of each element to pursue a 
public trust doctrine claim.54  First, the plaintiff must prove that he 
suffered an “injury in fact”; the claimed damages are not conjectural 
or hypothetical.55  Next, the plaintiff must prove that there is a nexus 
between the injury and the defendant’s conduct he is seeking to 
enjoin.56  This second element requires proof that the injury was not 
actually the result of an independent third party.57  Last, the plaintiff 
must prove that a favorable court order is likely—not merely 
speculative—to remedy the claimed injury.58 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Originally, the public trust doctrine only limited private 
ownership of lands beneath tidal waters.59  The first federal expansion 
of the doctrine can be traced back to an 1842 United States Supreme 
Court decision which held that the people also have the right to access 
and use navigable waters as well as the soil under them.60  These areas 
are also protected and cannot be alienated.61  Just a few years later, the 
Court recognized the Equal Footing Doctrine, which granted newly 
admitted states ownership of all tidal and navigable water within their 
borders, along with the soil beneath the water, to be held in trust for 
the benefit of the people.62  However, in utilizing the Equal Footing 
Doctrine, the United States retained ownership to any waters and lands 
beneath them that were not then navigable or tidal.63  Accordingly, the 
states were only granted title to navigable-in-fact waters and the lands 
 
53 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs, several 
wildlife organizations, lacked standing as they did not suffer a harm or injury that was not also 
suffered by all of the citizens). 
54 See generally id. 
55 Id. at 560-61. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.  See infra note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
standing.  
59 Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream 
Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 408 (1986).  
60 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 432-33 (1842). 
61 Id. (holding that after the revolution, the states received the king’s responsibility of 
holding certain property in trust, and therefore, any alienation of previously protected property 
would be a breach of the public trust doctrine). 
62 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228-29 (1845). 
63 PPL Montana, L.L.C. v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 591 (2012).  
8
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beneath them when they were navigable-in-fact at the time of 
statehood.64  Moreover, such analysis is to be performed on a segment-
by-segment basis,65 which has resulted in state ownership of portions 
of riverbeds and United States ownership of other portions of the same 
riverbeds.66 
The next major development in the federal public trust doctrine 
was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central 
R.R. v. Illinois.67  In that case, the Illinois legislature conveyed over 
1,000 acres of submerged lands beneath Lake Michigan to the Illinois 
Central Railroad Company.68  Ultimately, the Court invalidated the 
transfer and held that the conveyance directly conflicted with the 
public trust doctrine which protected the submerged lands and 
therefore substantially restricted the public’s ability to use the area for 
navigation, commerce and fishing.69  Navigable waters may only be 
alienated when doing so improves the public’s interest or would not 
impose a detriment to the public’s interest “in the lands and waters 
remaining.”70 
Under federal law, a body of water is navigable-in-fact when: 
(1) “[v]essels of any kind . . . can float upon the water;” (2) “are, or 
may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be conducted . 
. . in order to give it the character of a navigable stream;” or (3) is 
“generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or 
agriculture.”71  Nevertheless, if the water is not navigable-in-fact, but 
is tidal, it is still protected under the public trust doctrine.72  As a result 
of Illinois Central R.R., the federal public trust doctrine also preserves 
the people’s right to use navigable waters for navigation, commerce 
and fishing.  This is an expansion of the traditional navigable-in-law 
concept that merely protects any “[w]aterways that are affected by 
 
64 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
65 PPL Montana, 565 U.S. at 593. 
66 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 79. 
67 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  
68 Id. at 433-34. 
69 See generally id. 
70 Id. at 452. 
71 United States v. Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874). 
72 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1988) (affirming precedent 
that indicates state ownership of all tidal water—bodies of water that are affected by the “ebb 
and flow of the tide”). 
9
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tides,”73 and therefore, waters can receive public trust protection even 
if they are not affected by the tide. 
IV. INADEQUACY OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
While the federal doctrine provides the states with a good 
foundation to expand upon, it is currently inadequate because it is 
based largely on ancient prerogatives and only modestly accounts for 
changing times.74  Unlike most states that have legislation and case law 
to further their doctrines, the Arizona legislature has made several 
attempts to limit the public trust doctrine, thus, often defaulting to 
federal law.  Although Arizona enacted many laws in 1995 that 
appeared to extend its doctrine in regard to water rights,75 the 
legislature expressly stated that it “does not intend to create an 
implication that the public trust doctrine applies to water rights in this 
state.”76  Moreover, the state legislature even attempted to alienate the 
state’s ownership of all watercourses within the state, except for a few 
rivers, by quitclaim deed, and also to permit the issuance of a quitclaim 
deed for lands in or near the beds of the Gila, Salt and Verde Rivers 
for a small fee of only twenty-five dollars.77  In a 1991 decision, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that these legislative attempts to destroy 
a significant part of the state’s public trust doctrine were deemed an 
unlawful breach of the doctrine and the state’s constitution.78  
Subsequently, Governor Hull signed Senate Bill 1126 into law on May 
4, 1998, which again restricted the public trust doctrine.79  This 
legislation80 officially created a new navigability test that was more 
lenient than the federal approach and permitted an increased amount 
of alienation of areas that were otherwise inalienable pursuant to 
federal law.81  In February of 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
determined that the statute was unconstitutional and a violation of the 
 
73 Steven C. Russo, OGC 9: Enforcement Guidance: Public Rights of Navigation and 
Fishing, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Dec. 7, 2011), https://www.dec.ny.gov/ 
regulations/74771.html. 
74 See supra Section III. 
75 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-101-343 (LexisNexis 2018). 
76 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 9, § 25(B), p.36.  
77 Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
78 Id. at 174. 
79 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
80 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1129 (LexisNexis 1998). 
81 Defenders of Wildlife, 18 P.3d at 727. 
10
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public trust.82  While the state legislature made these repeated attempts 
to dismantle its public trust doctrine, the judicial branch worked to 
remedy this problem, announcing in an Arizona Supreme Court 
decision that the “public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on 
legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for 
its people.”83  Furthermore, the court indicated that it is “for the courts 
to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts.”84 
Similar to Arizona, Colorado has done very little to expand its 
doctrine.  For example, in 1976, in People v. Emmert,85 three 
individuals were floating on rafts on the Colorado River.86  Eventually, 
the river passed through a privately owned ranch that the individuals 
did not have permission to enter.87  The three individuals did not leave 
their rafts at any time, nor did they encroach upon the shoreline,88 but, 
nevertheless, they were arrested and eventually charged with third-
degree criminal trespass.89  The defendants were found guilty because 
they stipulated that they floated on a section of the river that could be 
privately owned because it was non-navigable and “not historically 
used for commercial or trade purposes of any kind.”90  Similarly, New 
York protects its riparian landowners as it only expanded its doctrine 
to protect waterways that “have practical usefulness to the public as a 
highway for transportation,”91 which would have similarly resulted in 
criminal convictions for the defendants.  However, a broader 
application of the doctrine, as demonstrated in New Hampshire, 
protects any “river or stream [that] is capable in its natural state of 
some useful service to the public because of its existence.”92  Arguably, 
the very same defendants in Emmert would not have faced trespass 
charges had they been in New Hampshire because the river served, in 
its natural state, usefulness for recreational transportation, which could 
be considered a useful service. 
 
82 Id. at 739. 
83 San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999). 
84 Id. 
85 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). 
86 Id. at 1026. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1030. 
90 Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026. 
91 N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2018). 
92 St. Regis Paper Co. v. N.H. Water Res. Bd., 26 A.2d 832, 838 (N.H. 1942). 
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While no state should be required to expand its doctrine to 
protect all rivers and streams for use by the public for any beneficial 
purpose, states should make meaningful expansions to ensure the 
public can fully enjoy their natural amenities.  When a state refuses to 
make any important expansions of its public trust doctrine, it must rely 
substantially on the federal doctrine.  Not only does this criminalize an 
act as innocuous as floating down a river that is non-navigable, it can 
also completely bar access to water that is navigable.  To date, the 
federal doctrine has not expanded to provide the public with any right 
to cross any dry sand areas to reach a navigable waterway.  
Accordingly, the federal doctrine could permit private ownership of 
land surrounding a body of navigable water and deny the public any 
rights to cross over any of the riparian owners’ property.  This 
effectively precludes the public from accessing the body of water that 
it otherwise has a right to access.  An effective remedy to this issue 
would be to follow New Jersey’s Matthews factors.93 
V. RIGHT TO ACCESS WATER HELD IN TRUST 
One of the many differences that exist among the states’ 
doctrines is the right to access water held in trust.  For example, some 
states criminalize crossing over the dry sand area of a private 
landowner to access trust waters or foreshores94 while other states 
encourage it.95 
A. New York 
Although New York is home to a substantial number of 
beautiful beaches and waterfront homes, there has been limited 
litigation regarding the application of the public trust doctrine to beach 
access.  Accordingly, the boundary between the private landowner’s 
rights and the public’s rights is unclear.96  Nevertheless, the extremely 
modest case law in this area suggests that the private property owner 
has the sole right to all real estate that is landward of the high water 
 
93 See discussion of the Matthews factors infra Section V.F. 
94 Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC91-0496, 1997 R.I. Super. LEXIS 21, at 
*28 (Oct. 10, 1997). 
95 See generally Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
96 Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 
11, at 87-88. 
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mark, none of which the public may lawfully use, while the public only 
has the right to access the lands seaward of the mean high water mark.97  
This approach could result in criminal charges against individuals who 
cross privately owned dry sand beaches to reach the foreshore.98  
Accordingly, New York prefers the rights of riparian landowners over 
those of the public, thus permitting the landowner to enjoy his real 
estate without the burden of beachgoers. 
B. Washington 
Washington’s doctrine provides the public with arguably the 
least water access as its appellate court refused to give the public any 
right to cross over any privately owned property and only affords its 
citizens the right to use the foreshore when it is covered by water.99  
When the tide is out, the people in Washington do not have any right 
to use the foreshore.100  Accordingly, the court has not only barred the 
people from crossing over a private owner’s land to reach the water 
under any circumstance, but it has also limited the time during which 
the public may use the foreshore. 
C. Rhode Island 
Rhode Island’s doctrine indicates that the government holds the 
foreshore below the mean high tide line in trust for the public to use; 
however, the public has no right to access dry sand areas above that 
line.101  This rule developed after James Cavanaugh, who failed to pay 
the beach admission fee, attempted to cross the dry sand area of a 
Rhode Island beach to reach the shoreline.102  The Town of 
Narragansett responded with criminal charges for failing to pay the 
 
97 Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1970).  High Water Mark, 
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/high-water-mark?s=t (last visited Oct. 
3, 2018) (defining high water mark as “the highest level reached by a body of water” during 
high tide). 
98 This approach is similar to Rhode Island’s doctrine in that crossing over privately owned 
dry sand beach to reach the foreshore could result in criminal charges.  Cavanaugh, 1997 R.I. 
Super. LEXIS, at *28. 
99 City of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, No. 31816-4-II, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1744, at 
*4 (July 20, 2005). 
100 Id. 
101 Cavanaugh, 1997 R.I. Super. LEXIS, at *28. 
102 Id. at *5. 
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beach admission fee.103  The court held that the public has no right to 
cross the dry sand area to reach the foreshore104 and ultimately found 
Cavanaugh guilty of a misdemeanor.105  This decision illustrates that if 
a body of water is entirely surrounded by privately owned property, 
the public has no right to cross it to reach the water, rendering it 
accessible only by the landowners. 
D. Massachusetts 
In a 1979 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that 
a private landowner owns all real estate landward of the mean low tide 
mark; however, the public retains an easement over the foreshore for 
the sole purposes of navigation, fishing and fowling.106  Almost twenty 
years later, the Appellate Court further indicated that the public has 
“no right to cross, without permission, the dry land of another for the 
purpose of gaining access to the water or the flats in order to exercise 
public trust rights; doing so constitutes a trespass.”107  Accordingly, 
Massachusetts appears to take a very pro-landowner position because 
it extends private ownership down to the mean low tide mark—an 
extension made by only a few states—and permits public access to the 
foreshore for only very limited activities.108  While this approach limits 
the public’s use of certain bodies of water, especially those completely 
surrounded by private land ownership, it respects the rights of the 
landowners and effectively prevents an unwanted easement across 
their land. 
E. Maryland 
Maryland similarly has a pro-landowner position.  In 
Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City,109 a real 
estate developer sought to construct a condominium on the dry sand 
area of an oceanfront lot.110  In an effort to halt the development, the 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at *28. 
105 Id. at *5. 
106 Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 365 (Mass. 1979). 
107 Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 
108 See infra notes 240-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public’s right to 
access property in relation to a watermark. 
109 332 A.2d 630 (Md. 1975). 
110 Id. at 632. 
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public filed suit claiming that the construction would prevent its access 
to the dry sand area, constituting a breach of the public trust doctrine.111  
The court quickly decided that the public trust doctrine only protects 
the foreshore, not any of the dry land above it.112  More recently, this 
was upheld in Clickner v. Magothy River Association Inc.,113 in which 
the court limited the doctrine to protect only the sand up to the mean 
high tide line.114  Accordingly, the “public has no right to access or 
cross privately owned upland sand areas in order to reach the public 
foreshore.”115 
F. New Jersey 
New Jersey has the broadest public trust doctrine in terms of 
providing the public with access to the foreshore because, in certain 
circumstances, it permits the public to cross over the dry sand area in 
order to reach the foreshore—even when the sand is privately 
owned.116  In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the dry 
sand area above the mean high water line may be subject to the public 
trust doctrine, thereby protecting it for the enjoyment by the people.117  
The court reasoned that, in order for the public to fully enjoy the rights 
preserved by the doctrine, it must also preserve a limited right in the 
dry areas just above the water line.118  However, the court indicated 
that the public’s right to the dry sand area was not absolute, but it 
created four factors to determine whether the public has access rights 
and, if so, the extent of those rights.  Known as the Matthews factors, 
they are used to determine whether property is subject to the doctrine.  
First, the court examines the dry sand area in relation to the 
foreshore.119  Second, it considers the magnitude and availability of 
publicly owned upland sand area.120  Third, it contemplates the nature 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 634.  
113 35 A.3d 464 (Md. 2012). 
114 Id. at 473. 
115 Jack Potash, The Public Trust Doctrine and Beach Access: Comparing New Jersey to 
Nearby States, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 661, 662 (2016). 
116 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the 
association was a quasi-public entity, thus the public has a right to cross the dry sand area that 
it owns). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 365. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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and extent of the public demand for access to the foreshore and use of 
the beach.121  Last, it studies the usage of the upland sand by the 
owner.122  The court reasoned that in certain circumstances, giving the 
public the right to use a portion of the dry sand area near the water 
provided for meaningful use of that water.123  Without granting this 
right, a body of water could ultimately be inaccessible to the public 
except for owners of land abutting the mean high water mark or those 
who have been granted permission to cross the land.  Moreover, this 
also prevents the public from being arrested for trespass. 
In Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis Beach Club, 
Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Matthews factors in a 
groundbreaking 2005 decision that rendered privately owned sand 
area—above the mean high water line—open to the public.124  Atlantis 
Beach Club, Inc. owned and operated a beach club in New Jersey, 
charged its members access fees to use the beach and restricted all 
nonmembers from gaining entry.125  The court held that this practice 
violated the public trust doctrine by restricting the public’s right to 
access the water.126  It further explained that  
Atlantis cannot limit [the public’s] vertical [crossing 
the dry sand area] or horizontal [use along the 
shoreline] . . . access to its dry sand beach area nor 
interfere with the public’s right to free use of the dry 
sand for intermittent recreational purposes connected 
with the ocean and wet sand.127   
It applied the Matthews factors to a private association which expanded 
the scope of the doctrine.  However, the court in Matthews envisioned 
such expansion.128 
New Jersey’s four-factor test is arguably the best approach to 
address beach access.  A strict approach that refuses the public any 
right to cross the dry land area of a private landowner substantially 
impacts the public’s right to use a body of water.  Such an approach 
does not further the public’s interests because, in many instances, it 
 
121 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 364. 
124 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Matthews, 471 A.2d at 366. 
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restricts people from using and enjoying public trust areas.  However, 
the public should still be respectful of the private owner’s interests and 
privacy concerns.  Using this four-factor test, the courts effectively 
consider both the public’s interests and the private landowners’ 
interests in reaching a decision that does not result in a complete 
prohibition to access a body of water and also does not subject each 
landowner to an unwanted easement.129  The Matthews factors, taken 
together, limit the public’s use when it would be overly burdensome to 
the landowner, while permitting access when doing so would be 
reasonable.  Although New York has not had a case that is directly on 
point, it should adopt this approach in an appropriate case. 
VI. PERMISSION TO ALIENATE AND RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The New York State Legislature retains the sole power and 
discretion to alienate, or otherwise change, the use of protected areas.  
There is but one instance in which legislative approval is not necessary 
for alienation and that is when a grant is pursuant to an urban renewal 
plan,130 which will be discussed in detail in section IX of this Note.  
The litigation in New York that has arisen under the public trust 
doctrine focused on whether the area in question was subject to the 
doctrine131 or whether a municipality had a duty to preserve an area,132 
keep it open to the public133 and retain title to it.134  None of the case 
law apparently involves review of a legislative grant.  This may 
indicate that the legislature is given complete deference in its decisions 
with regard to the public trust doctrine. 
Somewhat similar to New York, Illinois follows a title theory 
whereby the state’s title to the resources is impressed by a trust in favor 
of a particular use.135  Under this theory, legislative approval must be 
secured before any alienation.136  The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that 
 
129 Id. at 369 (holding that if a body of water is inaccessible due to private riparian land 
ownership, some of the privately owned land could be subject to unwanted easements). 
130 Vill. Green Realty Corp. v. Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. Agency, 466 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 
1983). 
131 See In re Glick v. Harvey, 36 N.E.3d 640 (N.Y. 2015). 
132 Evans v. Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
133 10 E. Realty, LLC v. Inc. Vill. of Val. Stream, 793 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 2005). 
134 Vill. Green Realty Corp., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 27. 
135 Thomas W. Merrill, The Public Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and 
Their Implications, 38 HAW. L. REV. 261 (2016). 
136 People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 780 (Ill. 1976). 
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legislative approval must withstand the most critical examination if the 
alienation is in favor of a private entity.137  Similarly, Washington 
courts use a heightened degree of scrutiny when reviewing any 
legislation relating to the public trust doctrine.138  However, these 
theories should be avoided.  In a case arising under the public trust 
doctrine, the court is not considering a suspect class, a fundamental 
right, or other highly sensitive and important subjects that would 
warrant a form of strict or heightened scrutiny, and therefore, is simply 
unnecessary.  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has ruled 
that weighing the advantages and disadvantages of certain issues is the 
role of the legislative branch, not the judicial branch, because it is 
sufficiently capable of determining what is in the best interest of the 
public due to the country’s democratic process.139  Since the legislature 
is elected directly by the people, limiting its ability to alienate 
protected areas reduces the public’s voice on how those areas should 
be utilized. 
Another interesting approach is found within Alaska’s 
Constitution, providing that “[w]herever occurring in their natural 
state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common 
use.”140  Alaska’s Supreme Court has interpreted this to simply create 
a trust for the people, not a public trust.141  Alaskan courts define the 
result of Article VIII of its Constitution as a trust-like relationship in 
which Alaska is to hold fish, wildlife, water and other natural resources 
in trust for the benefit of its citizens.142  Therefore, “instead of 
recognizing the creation of a public trust in the clause per se, we have 
noted that the common use clause was intended to engraft in [its] 
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, 
wildlife and water resources of the state.”143  Thus, Alaska’s public 
trust doctrine is not actually that broad since it appears to address 
protection of natural resources via an alternative route that mirrors a 
 
137 Id. 
138 Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that a “statute enacted through the initiative process is presumed constitutional and the party 
challenging it bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Nonetheless, courts review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree 
of judicial scrutiny, as if measuring the legislation against constitutional protections” (citations 
omitted)). 
139 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
140 ALASKA CONST. amend. VIII, § 3. 
141 Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
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traditional doctrine.  This approach is analogous to that of Hawaii’s by 
requiring a constitutional amendment to alter the trust while leaving 
the courts with the substantial power of interpreting the state’s 
constitution. 
Although similar to the Alaskan approach, Hawaii is slightly 
more protective.  Hawaii follows a constitutional theory where the 
constitution “mandates that certain resources be devoted to particular 
public uses,”144 effectively requiring a constitutional amendment to 
otherwise alienate an area.  Since the doctrine is almost completely 
embedded in the state constitution, “ultimate authority to interpret and 
defend the public trust in Hawai’i rests with the courts.”145  This 
procedure should also be avoided because, not only does the legislature 
have little control in alienating a protected area or changing its use, any 
changes to Hawaii’s doctrine requires a constitutional amendment 
either through a constitutional convention or by the legislature 
proposing a constitutional amendment to the electorate.146  While 
allowing the electorate to decide these issues would be ideal, this 
process fails to account for the excessive amount of time it would take 
to make any changes and the fact that the entire state would  determine 
the use of a specific area.  This means that an individual, hundreds of 
miles away from the subject site, who may have never visited it, would 
have the same voting right as the individual who may be interested in 
developing it.  Accordingly, if a small community sought to develop a 
few acres of protected land to build a school, courthouse, sporting 
facility or otherwise, those who do not have easy access to the facilities 
would likely vote it down simply to preserve protected areas without 
engaging in a meaningful examination of the matter. 
What may surprise many is that New York has the preferable 
method of alienation and judicial review as compared to these few 
states; however, it is still not perfect.  It allows for the elected 
legislature to make decisions on behalf of the people, leaving a 
political remedy should it go astray.  This is similar to the approach of 
the Washington Supreme Court which held that once property is 
“acquired and devoted to public use [it] is held in trust for the public 
and cannot be alienated without legislative authority, either express or 
 
144 Merrill, supra note 135, at 261.  
145 Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Kaua’i, 324 P.3d 951, 975 (Haw. 2014). 
146 Revision and Amendment of Hawaii State Constitution, ST. HAW. OFF. ELECTIONS, 
http://elections.hawaii.gov/resources/revision-and-amendment-of-the-hawaii-state-
constitution/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). 
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implied.”147  However, New York courts should have more power to 
decide on the merits of a proposed alienation of parkland, which is the 
subject of a substantial amount of litigation in the state arising under 
the doctrine.  When a suit is filed that invokes public trust doctrine 
protection of parkland, the New York courts first review the 
classification of the area.148  When a party claims that an area has been 
expressly or impliedly classified as parkland or dedicated to public use, 
the courts should have appropriate authority to determine whether the 
area is appropriately subject to the doctrine.  However, when an area 
is expressly classified as parkland, the courts seem to lack any power 
of judicial review or, more likely, provide complete deference to the 
municipality that classified the area.149  While it is important to give 
substantial deference to the municipal agencies that handle express 
classification, we must be wary of areas that may have been 
misclassified or not sufficiently used by the public.  The very definition 
of a “park is, in its strict sense, a piece of ground inclosed [sic] for 
purposes of pleasure, exercise, amusement or ornament.”150  A park 
“need not and should not be a mere field or open space.”151  When an 
area is impliedly or expressly classified as parkland, the court should 
take a more active role in determining whether that classification is 
accurate by considering whether the public uses the area, the extent to 
which the public utilizes the area, and the purposes for which the public 
uses the area.  This will prevent misclassification of an area that should 
not be labeled as a park. 
Moreover, the courts should also retain discretion to review the 
grant by the legislature with a rational basis type of test, whereby the 
court exercises a relatively lenient review of the grant.  This review 
should consider whether the grant would significantly adversely 
impact local residents from having access to that type of amenity (i.e., 
whether the citizens would have reasonable access to a park if the 
legislature alienates one) and whether the grant would have any 
detrimental impacts on the surrounding areas to constitute a partial 
taking, such as significantly decreased property values, or cause a 
burdensome nuisance.  This type of review will allow the courts and 
 
147 City of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1744, at *45 (July 20, 
2005). 
148 In re Avella v. N.Y.C., 80 N.E.3d 982, 983 (N.Y. 2017). 
149 See generally id. 
150 Perrin v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 36 N.Y. 120, 124 (1867). 
151 Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920). 
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the legislature to share a fair separation of powers while giving the 
legislature substantial deference to ensure adhering to the voice of the 
people. 
VII. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO POLLUTION 
AND WILDLIFE 
Global warming is a substantial and growing problem in the 
twenty-first century152 and has caused an extensive list of lawsuits that 
have invoked public trust doctrine protection; however, many states 
refuse to allow a pollution claim pursuant to their doctrines.153  Many 
of these lawsuits have resulted in unfavorable decisions for the 
plaintiffs because many states refuse to acknowledge that pollution 
comes within the scope of the doctrine.154  Moreover, in many 
instances, it is impossible to pinpoint the polluter, which ultimately 
causes standing issues.155 
One state that refused to include pollution as an item that can 
be controlled under the doctrine is New Mexico.  The New Mexico 
Court of Appeals refused to extend the public trust doctrine to include 
the regulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere on the grounds 
that such regulation should be addressed by the legislature, and any 
claims should arise under the state’s Air Quality Control Act.156  
Furthermore, the court held that any decision on the issue without 
consideration of the Act would be a clear violation of the separation of 
powers principles.157  Similarly, Alaska’s Supreme Court dismissed a 
plaintiff’s claim that the state breached its fiduciary duty to preserve 
the atmosphere, thus, causing adverse effects on the water, shorelines, 
wildlife and fish, and held that the other governmental branches should 
handle such regulation.158 
 
152 Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Challenging Global Warming as a Social 
Problem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement’s Counter-Claims, 47 SOC. PROBS. 499 
(2000). 
153 See Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Kanuk v. State, 
335 P.3d 1088, 1103 (Alaska 2014); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. 
Or. 2016); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012); Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013). 
154 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013). 
155 Id. 
156 Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1227. 
157 Id. 
158 Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1103. 
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Even more recently, a group of young United States citizens 
filed suit against the federal government claiming it breached its 
fiduciary duty pursuant to the public trust doctrine.159  In Juliana v. 
United States, the plaintiffs alleged that the federal government’s 
decisions regarding regulating carbon dioxide emissions, permitting 
fossil fuel extraction, giving tax breaks and directly subsidizing the 
fossil fuel industry, funding natural gas pipelines, regulating the import 
and export of fossil fuels, and authorizing new marine coal terminal 
projects all had an adverse effect on climate change.160  The plaintiffs 
argued that these items, taken together, should constitute a breach of 
the fiduciary duties under the public trust doctrine.161  Although the 
court refused to decide whether the atmosphere is protected under the 
doctrine,162 it found that the plaintiffs’ claim that the government’s 
actions have caused them to suffer the negative consequences of ocean 
acidification and rising ocean temperatures—assets that are typically 
protected under the doctrine—were sufficient to allow the case to 
proceed.  Because a number of the plaintiffs’ injuries related to the 
effects of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures, the 
plaintiffs adequately alleged harm to public trust assets.163 
Similarly, Pennsylvania has a doctrine that vests the people 
with a right to “clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment [that 
are] . . . common property of all the people, including generations yet 
to come” and that “the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain 
them for the benefit of all the people.”164  The state’s Supreme Court 
declared that this constitutional provision “installs the common law 
public trust doctrine as a constitutional right to environmental 
protection,” which is “susceptible to enforcement by an action in 
equity.”165  Accordingly, it is possible that a plaintiff may be successful 
in filing a pollution claim arising under the doctrine in Pennsylvania. 
 
159 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). 
160 Id. at 1255. 
161 Id. at 1234. 
162 Id. at 1255. 
163 Id. at 1256. 
164 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see also Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1973) (relying on both the public trust doctrine and the Pennsylvania Constitution to require 
maintenance of “clean air . . . and [] the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic 
values of the environment”).  
165 Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (Pa. 1973) 
(emphasis in original). 
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Slightly similar to Pennsylvania’s, Alaska’s public trust 
doctrine indicates that the “[s]tate holds certain resources (such as 
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use, ‘and that 
government owes a fiduciary duty to manage such resources for the 
common good of the public as beneficiary.’”166  However, while 
Alaska’s Supreme Court held in Baxley v. State167 that the state owes 
the public a fiduciary duty in managing the resources, the court held in 
Brady v. State168—just five months later—that the state need not be 
proactive in protecting trust property.169  In the latter case, the court 
found that the state was not liable for waste when beetles were severely 
destroying forests, which placed a significant limit on the state’s 
fiduciary duty in managing the trust res.170  Thus, the court apparently 
indicated that the government could allow passive degradation while 
imposing a duty to protect against active damage.  Even utilizing this 
theory would be beneficial to New York since it has not yet developed 
an approach to polluted water.171 
While the New York doctrine goes to great lengths to protect 
parks, it seems to take a backseat when considering pollution.172  For 
example, a New York court ruled that, although sewage was 
intentionally being dumped into the Cayadutta Creek, the state did not 
have a duty to prevent such acts.173  The court reasoned that even if the 
creek was navigable and subject to the public trust doctrine, there was 
no indication that the pollution interfered with the public’s right to fish 
or access the waterway for navigation.174  While it is understood that a 
broadening “of the public trust doctrine for no other reason than to 
protect the environment simply ignores the economic precedent 
 
166 Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
167 Id. 
168 Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1998). 
169 See, e.g., id. 
170 Id. at 17. 
171 Evans v. Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that we must 
disallow any action that interferes “with the public’s right to fish or with the public’s right of 
access for navigation”).  However, the pollution ultimately resulted in the D.E.C.’s indicating 
that recreational use and aquatic life had been adversely impacted.  Mohawk/Cayadutta Creek 
Watershed, N.Y. DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERVATION (Aug. 14, 2002) https://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/ 
water_pdf/wimohawkcayadutta.pdf. 
172 See infra Section VIII. 
173 Evans, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 207. 
174 Id.  Similarly, legislative approval was required for the construction of a bridge that 
would interfere with navigation. Macrum v. Hawkins, 184 N.E. 817 (N.Y. 1933). 
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established by the original doctrine itself,”175 the public does not want 
to engage in recreational activities in polluted water.  The court, 
nevertheless, ruled that the state’s public trust doctrine did not apply176 
and dismissed the plaintiffs’ relevant cause of action.  New York State 
should have utilized California’s theory, developed just two years 
later, that placed an affirmative duty upon the state to “take the public 
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, 
and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”177  When the future 
life of a body of water was placed in jeopardy due to a diversion of 
several small streams that sustained the water level, the California 
Supreme Court permitted the invocation of the State’s public trust 
doctrine to end such practice.178  The New York Court of Appeals 
should have acknowledged that pollution could be detrimental to the 
longevity of Cayadutta Creek, and, therefore, should have been a direct 
violation of the doctrine.  It is unfortunate that the 1964 New York 
Times article that addressed the pollution of Cayadutta Creek was not 
discussed in the litigation.179  The article specifically noted that the 
public no longer swam in the creek, and many could no longer stand 
to be near it due to the stench of contamination.180  Courts should 
disregard the Evans v. Johnson181 decision and set new precedent that 
preserves the res placed under that state’s doctrine.  The simple fact 
that the Department of Environmental Conservation published a fact 
sheet that provides that the Cayadutta Creek has suffered a decrease in 
aquatic life and recreational use should render the Evans decision null 
and void.182 
If a case similar to Evans v. Johnson confronted the courts of 
another jurisdiction, such as Louisiana, it is very likely the result would 
have been different.  In Louisiana, “[t]he natural resources of the state, 
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic 
quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and 
 
175 George P. Smith, II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural 
Law: Emanations Within A Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006). 
176 Evans, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 207. 
177 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983). 
178 Id. at 711. 
179 Neil Sheehan, The Creek at Gloversville—A Picturesque, Meandering Sewer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/12/28/the-creek-at-gloversvillea-
picturesque-meandering-sewer.html. 
180 Id.  
181 Evans, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 199. 
182 Mohawk/Cayadutta Creek Watershed, supra note 171. 
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replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, 
and welfare of the people.”183  The Louisiana First Circuit indicated 
that this section of the constitution is the state’s public trust doctrine 
and must be respected.184  Accordingly, had the Louisiana courts heard 
Evans v. Johnson, they would likely have found a clear violation of the 
public trust doctrine because the state would have a duty to preserve 
the creek and its general healthfulness.  
While no state has clearly stated that its public trust doctrine 
applies to pollution in general, many states have extended their 
doctrines’ protection to wildlife.185  On February 2, 1976, the Steuart 
Transportation Company (hereinafter “Steuart”) inadvertently spilled 
a large amount of oil in the Chesapeake Bay, killing approximately 
30,000 migratory birds.186  Subsequently, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia and the United States filed suit for the loss of migratory 
waterfowl.187  Although Steuart argued that neither the federal nor state 
government could sue for the loss of waterfowl it did not own, the court 
ruled that ownership is irrelevant.188  The court ultimately found in 
favor of both plaintiffs, holding that the state and federal government’s 
duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in wildlife resources 
was sufficient to bring the claim.189 
California went one step further than Virginia when it 
statutorily developed a second public trust doctrine.  This second 
doctrine was based on California’s Fish and Game Code, which states 
that “[t]he fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of 
the state by and through the department.”190  The state legislature found 
that “[f]ish and wildlife are the property of the people and provide a 
major contribution to the economy of the state, as well as provide a 
significant part of the people’s food supply; therefore, their 
conservation is a proper responsibility of the state.”191  This second 
doctrine becomes evident in a 1981 California Supreme Court decision 
 
183 LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
184 La. Seafood Mgmt. Council v. La. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm’n, 719 So. 2d 119, 124 
(La. Ct. App. 1998).  
185 See generally N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0103 (McKinney 2018); CAL. FISH & 
GAME CODE § 711.7(a) (West 2018). 
186 In re Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
187 Id.  
188 Id. at 40. 
189 Id. 
190 CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 711.7(a) (West 2018). 
191 Id. § 1600. 
25
Fink: New York's Public Trust Doctrine
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
1226 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
that ruled that the “shorezone is a fragile and complex resource.”192  
The court further explained that “[i]t provides the environment 
necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish . . . , birds . . . , 
and many other species of wildlife and plants.”193  Moreover, in a 2008 
decision, California’s Supreme Court announced that wildlife must be 
protected.194 
California’s wildlife doctrine was vital in 1980, when 
California’s State Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Commission created a field of turbines that generated electricity from 
the wind.195  Between 1981 and 2005, the generators “killed tens of 
thousands of birds, including between 17,000 and 26,000 raptors—
more than a thousand Golden Eagles, thousands of hawks, and 
thousands of other raptors.”196  The Center for Biological Diversity, 
Inc. filed suit claiming that the state violated its own public trust 
doctrine because it failed to protect and serve wildlife.197  Not only did 
the court find in the plaintiff’s favor, but the court also held that it is 
irrelevant that the public did not own the wildlife.198  It is extremely 
important that the court decided that ownership is irrelevant because 
of the difficulty in determining ownership.  Many wild animals, 
especially birds, migrate from state to state and even from country to 
country.199  If the government was forced to prove ownership of the 
wildlife that is at the center of a public trust doctrine claim, it would 
often fail.  This could result in extremely minimal or even no public 
trust protection of wildlife.  Furthermore, ownership is not necessarily 
vital in a public trust doctrine claim, as was evident in the New Jersey 
Supreme Court case, Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantis 
Beach Club, Inc., in which the court simply held that the public has a 
right to access privately owned lands to reach publicly owned 
property.200 
 
192 State v. Superior Court of Placer Cty., 625 P.2d 256, 259 (Cal. 1981). 
193 Id. 
194 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 
2008). 
195 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 591 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
196 Id. at 592. 
197 Id. at 591. 
198 Id. at 598-99. 
199 Animal Migration, LIST THINGS, LIST EVERYTHING (Mar. 4, 2011), 
https://listofeverything.wordpress.com/2011/03/04/list-of-animals-that-migrate-animal-
migration-list/. 
200 Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. 879 A.2d 112, 129 (N.J. 2005). 
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While some states may wish to extend public trust protection 
to wildlife, states should not use it to protect against pollution in all 
circumstances.  Pollution in general should not be subject to the public 
trust doctrine when a specific polluter cannot be identified because it 
is the legislature’s responsibility to institute acceptable levels of 
pollution.  However, when a polluter can be identified, the doctrine 
should be an appropriate vehicle to seek injunctive relief.  It is the role 
of the federal and state legislatures to determine what an appropriate 
level of pollution is, and then the judicial branch can interpret and 
enforce any legislation created to sustain those appropriate levels.201  
For this reason, it would be inappropriate for any court to permit a 
claim against a government pursuant to the public trust doctrine for 
failing to keep pollution to a minimal level.202  However, each state 
should recognize that pollution—when caused by an identifiable group 
rather than society itself—should fall within the protection of the 
public trust doctrine when it affects a protected resource.  When 
society itself is causing pollution, it is the job of the legislature to 
decide when, and if, the pollution is excessive, and then authorize 
agencies to implement suitable regulations.203  All of this country’s 
courts should permit a claim pursuant to the public trust doctrine only 
if a specific polluter can be identified, and such pollution directly and 
adversely affects the public’s right to use trust property.  All other 
pollution claims should arise under either federal or state legislation. 
VIII. THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CAN 
DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD 
It is long established in New York that legislative approval is 
required when leasing parkland, even for park purposes.204  However, 
an interesting turn of events occurred when the New York City 
Department of Parks and Recreation (hereinafter “DPR”) allowed the 
operation of a restaurant in Union Square Park with certain 
conditions.205  The DPR allowed Chef Driven Market, LLC to operate 
a restaurant in parkland without legislative approval; however, DPR 
 
201 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). 
202 See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Air Quality 
Control Act. 
203 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
204 Union Sq. Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 8 N.E.3d 797, 
801 (N.Y. 2014). 
205 Id. at 802. 
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“retained significant control over the daily operations of the restaurant, 
including the months and hours of operation, staffing plan, work 
schedules and menu prices.”206  Moreover, the restaurant was only 
seasonal, was not permitted to retain exclusive right to the premise, 
such as to prohibit the general public from using the seating area, and 
needed to open its pavilion to the public once per week for community 
events.207  Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals found these 
restrictions to be tantamount to a revocable license—not a lease—thus, 
legislative approval was not necessary because the provisions created 
a restaurant that complied with park purposes.208  New York 
municipalities may convey a revocable license to use parkland so long 
as the use complies with park purposes, is subject to direction, 
regulation and revocation at the will of the municipality.209 
Instead of granting a license as New York City did in the Union 
Square Park case, the New York State legislature approved the 
construction of Shea Stadium on Queens parkland, known as Willets 
West, and permitted the parcel’s use for stadium purposes.210  Upon 
the demolition of Shea Stadium, the land became a parking lot for the 
new stadium.211  This new use was still considered stadium purposes, 
as the parking lot was used in conjunction with the new stadium, Citi 
Field.212  Just to the east of Willets West, there is a tract of land known 
as Willets Point, or more popularly known as the “Valley of Ashes” as 
coined by F. Scott Fitzgerald.213  Although the development project 
would have included schools, retail centers and housing (including low 
income housing), arguably using the land to its highest and best use, 
the New York courts still struck the proposal because it included the 
development of parkland at Willets West.  Not only was one simply a 
parking lot for the use of baseball fans, the second lot was a “blighted 
and contaminated tract of land,” both of which would benefit greatly 
from the planned development.214 
 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 See generally Miller v. City of New York, 203 N.E. 478 (N.Y. 1964). 
210 Avella v. N.Y.C., 80 N.E.3d 982, 984 (N.Y. 2017). 
211 Id. at 992. 
212 Id. 
213 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 23 (1925).  In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 992 
(DiFiore, C.J., dissenting). 
214 In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 992 (DiFiore, C.J., dissenting). 
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In fact, the New York judicial application of the doctrine takes 
such a strong stance on protection of parkland that in 2001, the Court 
of Appeals issued a decision that ultimately put the preservation of a 
park and its golf course before the health of New York City 
residents.215  The Croton Watershed is one of New York City’s three 
primary sources of drinking water and supplies between ten and thirty 
percent of the City’s requirements.216  After the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency demanded that the City filter and 
disinfect the water derived from the Croton Watershed, the City 
planned to construct a watershed beneath Van Cortlandt Park.217  The 
construction would have taken six years, rendered the use of twenty-
eight acres of parkland unusable until the construction was completed, 
and required the demolition of the golf course and driving range that 
would have been reconstructed upon completion of the project.218  
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals held that because the 
construction would have prohibited the public from using twenty-eight 
acres of land and the golf facilities, the project required legislative 
approval regardless of the fact that the construction would only be 
temporary and would ultimately decrease the health risks associated 
with consuming New York City’s drinking water.219 
Similar to New York’s strong preservation of parkland, Illinois 
follows a strict criticism theory when reviewing legislative alienation.  
Such an extreme criticism was exercised in Lake Michigan Federation 
v. United States Army Corp of Engineers, a 1990 decision that involved 
the not-for-profit Loyola University of Chicago (hereinafter “Loyola”) 
after it made attempts to expand its campus.220  Loyola was adjacent to 
Lake Michigan and sought legislative and municipal approval to 
purchase approximately eighteen acres of the lake.221  Loyola intended 
to fill the purchased land and build several athletic fields, a track for 
running, biking and walking, all of which would remain open to the 
public.222  Loyola’s improvement of the land not only would have 
benefitted the public’s enjoyment of it, but Loyola was a not-for-profit 
 
215 See, e.g., Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. N.Y.C., 750 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001). 
216 Id. at 1051. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 1051-52. 
219 Id. at 1054-55. 
220 Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill 1990). 
221 Id. at 443. 
222 Id. 
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educational facility and had already received the proper governmental 
approval.223  Nevertheless, the court found that the grant violated the 
public trust doctrine.224  The court reasoned that under the strict 
criticism approach, any alienation of protected areas for the benefit of 
a private interest violates the doctrine and “any attempt to relinquish 
its power over a public resource should be invalidated under the 
doctrine.”225  Such a strict approach should not be utilized because 
sometimes, as in this case, alienation of protected trust property is 
warranted and could provide the public with a substantial benefit. 
While Illinois is very protective of trust res, the decision in 
Lake Michigan Federation v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 
was not in the best interests of the public.  As Professor Jay Wexler 
correctly stated, we must pay attention to the “connections between 
public health and public lands” and parks.226  Studies have suggested 
that parks attract people of all backgrounds and the soothing landscape 
acts as a catalyst towards increasing mingling and sociability, 
ultimately benefiting public mental health and the feeling of 
equality.227  Accordingly, Loyola’s proposed development of Lake 
Michigan would have benefitted the public by creating new areas 
similar to parkland.  Moreover, Professor Wexler’s comments support 
New York’s strong protection of parkland; however, New York should 
consider an alternative to its current classification process.  As of now, 
simply listing property as parkland on the local municipal’s assessment 
roll is conclusive as to its classification.  This can cause a piece of 
property owned by a municipality to be deemed inalienable, even when 
reclassifying it as alienable would increase its usefulness and 
enjoyment by the public.  For example, a recent Newsday article 
indicated that at least over the past decade, Nassau County, New York 
purchased over three hundred acres of land that was intended to be 
developed into parks.228  However, those plans fell through and most 
of the land is overgrown by brush, and some is even fenced off to 
prevent the public from entering the land.229  Nevertheless, Nassau 
 
223 Id. at 455-56. 
224 Id.; Merrill, supra note 135, at 269. 
225 Lake Mich. Fed’n, 742 F. Supp. at 445. 
226 Jay D. Wexler, Parks as Gyms? Recreational Paradigms and Public Health in the 
National Parks, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 188 (2004). 
227 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986). 
228 LaRocco, supra note 17. 
229 LaRocco, supra note 17. 
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County is restricted from alienating the land except for urban renewal 
or if it receives legislative approval.  The courts should be more active 
in determining whether a certain parcel is properly categorized as a 
park, thus, deciding whether alienation without legislative approval is 
proper.  New York may benefit from following Pennsylvania’s 
approach that permits the alienation of trust res when it cannot viably 
be used for the purposes it was originally dedicated.230  This would 
allow a court to rule that parcels, such as those owned by Nassau 
County, are not properly classified as parkland.  The government 
would then be able to sell these parcels to parties that intend to use the 
land instead of their being fenced off and not used at all. 
IX. NEW YORK’S DOCTRINE IS NOT AS OVERLY BURDENSOME 
AS MANY MAY BELIEVE 
It may come as a surprise to many, especially real estate 
developers and riparian landowners, that New York’s doctrine is less 
restrictive and burdensome than its counterparts in many states in 
several ways.231  First, New York has not expanded the federal 
navigable-in-fact test to determine whether a particular body of water 
is held in trust.  Accordingly, New York only preserves waterways that 
are navigable in their natural or unimproved condition, and allows for 
substantial and permanent commerce.232  Pursuant to the New York 
doctrine, “theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is 
temporary, precarious and unprofitable is not sufficient.”233  The 
waterway “must have practical usefulness to the public as a highway 
for transportation.”234  This is only a minor expansion of the federal 
 
230 In re Estate of Ryerss, 987 A.2d 1231, 1236 n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).  See also 
Borough of Downingtown v. Friends of Kardon Park, 55 A.3d 163, 169 n.9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2012). 
231 Greg Wehner, Judge Dismises [sic] Lawsuit Challenging Picnic Area Beach Driving, 
Parking In Southampton Village, 27EAST.COM (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:31 PM), 
http://www.27east.com/news/article.cfm/General-Interest-Southampton/550818/Judge-
Dismises-Lawsuit-Challenging-Picnic-Area-Beach-Driving-Parking-In-Southampton-
Village (homeowners complaining of the public’s use of the beach).  See infra note 240. 
232 N.Y. NAV. LAW § 2(5) (McKinney 2018). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
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requirement derived from Illinois Central R.R., which requires the 
waterway to support vast commerce.235 
While New York has only made a modest expansion of its 
navigability test, minimally encroaching on the rights of riparian 
landowners, other states take a very different approach.  For example, 
New Hampshire uses a variation of the navigability test that expands 
its doctrine to protect any “river or stream [that] is capable in its natural 
state of some useful service to the public because of its existence.”236  
The New Hampshire Supreme Court further broadened its doctrine by 
indicating that the protected waterways are held in trust for public use 
for any lawful and useful purpose—a drastic increase in public trust 
protection compared to the traditional use for navigation and fishing.237  
Even more of a drastic expansion of the doctrine occurred when the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that any waterway that can, and does, 
float logs or rafts shall be protected under the doctrine.238  Such an 
expansion increases the number of waterways and waterbeds that are 
held in trust, increasing the benefit to the public; however, this causes 
the taking of property from the owners of such lands.  While this 
expansion certainly increases the benefit to the public, it causes a 
substantial burden upon property owners that have to turn over 
portions of their land to the state. 
Another burden that New Yorkers do not face is criminal 
penalties for breach of the doctrine.  North Dakota codified a law that 
charges citizens with a misdemeanor if they, in any manner, obstruct 
the free navigation of any navigable watercourse within this state.239  
While it is important to protect certain territories from alienation or 
privatization, criminalizing such conduct significantly deters 
development near public trust protected areas because of fear of 
inadvertent breach.  Moreover, it also may chill the use of the 
waterways in a way that could be viewed as an obstruction of 
navigation and, thus, running counter to the purpose of the doctrine. 
 
235 United States v. Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874).  See supra notes 64-66 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of how the public trust doctrine can protect a body of water 
in certain sections that are navigable. 
236 St. Regis Paper Co. v. N.H. Water Res. Bd., 26 A.2d 832, 838 (N.H. 1942). 
237 Id. 
238 Floyd Cty. v. Allen, 227 S.W. 994, 995 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921). 
239 N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-08 (2017). 
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While many New York riparian landowners may express 
discontent240 with the fact that the public has the right to use land below 
the high water mark of their backyards when the body of water is held 
in trust,241 it may surprise them that this is common across the country.  
In fact, only a very small handful of states recognize title to the mean 
low water mark,242 and some of them only acknowledge limited 
ownership rights.243  Moreover, a New York riparian landowner seems 
to have unfettered discretion to use the foreshore without causing a 
violation of the doctrine so long as the public can still access its natural 
state; any alteration of the area could result in trespass charges.244  The 
Town of Oyster Bay filed suit against a riparian landowner, Tiffany, 
after he filled in the foreshore below the high water mark near his home 
in Oyster Bay, Long Island.245  The court ultimately held that Tiffany 
was liable for trespass246 and responsible for the cost of removing the 
fill.247  This issue was addressed more recently in a New York trial 
court decision in Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan.248  In that case, the 
defendant, a private landowner, had placed fill from the high-water line 
across the foreshore.249  The court ultimately found that the defendant’s 
action was not a violation of the public trust doctrine because the 
placement of the fill did not interfere with the plaintiff’s or public’s 
right to reasonable, and convenient, access to the water for navigation, 
fishing or similar purposes.250  Instead, the court found the defendant 
liable for trespass.251  The court essentially ruled that as long as the 
public still has access to the resource, there is no violation.252 
 
240 Steven Gaines, Who Owns the Sand? Beach Squabbles in East Hampton, DAILY 
INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 30, 2012), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/03/who-owns-
the-sand-beach-squabbles-in-east-hampton.html. 
241 Sage v. N.Y.C., 47 N.E. 1096 (N.Y. 1897). 
242 See McDonald v. Whitehurst, 47 F. 757 (E.D. Va. 1891), aff’d, 52 F. 633 (4th Cir. 1892); 
Phillips v. State, 449 A.2d 250 (Del. 1982) (holding that any taking above the low water mark 
would be a condemnation); Orange v. Resnick, 109 A. 864, 867 (Conn. 1920); Citizens’ Elec. 
Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 113 A. 559, 561 (Pa. 1921). 
243 Mitchell v. St. Paul, 31 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Minn. 1948). 
244 Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, 136 N.E. 224 (N.Y. 1922). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 226. 
247 Id. 
248 Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
249 Id. at 544. 
250 Id. at 548. 
251 Id. at 550. 
252 Id. 
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Another reason New York’s doctrine is not overly burdensome 
is because legislative approval is not required when making a grant for 
urban renewal purposes pursuant to the New York General Municipal 
Law, Article 15, § 502(3).253  Urban renewal is defined as a plan 
created by a municipality which includes, but is not limited to, 
“redevelopment, through clearance, replanning, reconstruction, 
rehabilitation, and concentrated code enforcement . . . of substandard 
and insanitary areas of such municipalities, and for recreational and 
other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto . . . .”254  Further, 
clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation are defined as 
“renewal, redevelopment, conservation, restoration or improvement or 
any combination thereof as well as relocation activities and the testing 
and reporting of methods and techniques for the arrest, prevention and 
elimination of slums and blight.”255  Moreover, the designation of an 
area as “substandard and insanitary,” is an administrative task, not a 
legislative act that gives municipalities much flexibility in determining 
which areas may qualify.256  Accordingly, whenever property is 
conveyed by an Urban Renewal Agency,257 for the purpose of 
improving such real estate, the transfer will likely be upheld even if the 
resulting product is not open for public use.  Nevertheless, there is very 
limited case law involving public trust doctrine claims and alienation 
for urban renewal.258 
The difference Article 15 § 503-a(4) makes in terms of 
alienating public trust lands is most clear when comparing a grant 
made by the Incorporated Village of Valley Stream259 and the 
Incorporated Village of Lynbrook.260  A municipal parking lot located 
within the Village of Valley Stream was held by the Village for public 
use, and therefore, protected by the public trust doctrine.261  
Accordingly, when Valley Stream officials attempted to lease the 
 
253 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2018). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Fisher v. Becker, 258 N.E.2d 727, 727 (N.Y.1970). 
257 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502(3) (Agency is simply an “officer, board, commission, 
department, or other agency of the municipality” authorized to carry and direct the renewal 
project.). 
258 See, e.g., Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 554 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (App. Div. 1990); 
Fisher, 258 N.E.2d at 727. 
259 10 E. Realty, LLC v. Inc. Vill. of Val. Stream, 793 N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 2005). 
260 Fisher, 258 N.E.2d at 727. 
261 10 E. Realty, LLC, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 123. 
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space to a private entity for private use without securing legislative 
approval, the court found this to be a breach of the doctrine and 
declared the lease invalid.262  In contrast, the Village of Lynbrook was 
permitted to convey its municipal parking lot for the construction of 
privately owned retail and office space because the Village determined 
the lands were substandard and unsanitary.263 Therefore, the 
conveyance was valid as an urban renewal plan.264 
This municipal law is very important because New York 
expanded its doctrine to provide extremely broad and strict protection 
of parkland, yet subjects it to alienation for urban renewal purposes.265  
Real property can become designated for public use or a public park 
via an “express or implied offer by the owner and, where required, an 
express or implied acceptance by the public.”266  Any property 
designated as parkland is held in trust for the benefit of the citizens and 
any alienation of the property for non-park purposes requires approval 
by the legislature that must be “‘plainly conferred’” in advance of such 
use.267  In a 1983 decision, the New York Appellate Division, in 
Village Green Realty Corporation v. Glen Cove Community 
Development Agency, held that parks may also be alienated pursuant 
to urban renewal because Article 15 § 503-a(4) does not expressly bar 
its application to parkland.268 
In Village Green Realty Corporation, a developer acquired 
parkland from the City of Glen Cove for the purposes of urban 
renewal; it sought and obtained an opinion from the New York State 
Comptroller as to the legality of the conveyance.269  The Comptroller’s 
decision indicated that the City of Glen Cove had the authority to 
 
262 Id. 
263 Fisher, 258 N.E.2d at 727. 
264 Id. 
265 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 2001) 
(holding that placing a water treatment plant underneath a park will not interfere with using 
the park for park purposes; however, the construction will deprive the public from using the 
park for at least five years).  Moreover, the requirement that alienated trust res be utilized for 
urban renewal is vital as the project would effectively turn blighted real estate into usable land. 
266 Angiolillo v. Town of Greenburgh, 735 N.Y.S.2d 66, 73 (App. Div. 2001).  See also 
Lazore v. Bd. of Trs., 594 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 1993). 
267 Friends of Van Cortland Park, 750 N.E.2d at 1055 (quoting Ackerman v. Steisel, 104 
A.D.2d 940 (1984)).  See also Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243 
(1871). 
268 Vill. Green Realty Corp. v. Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. Agency, 466 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 
1983). 
269 Id. at 27. 
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convey the parkland absent legislative approval pursuant to the 
General Municipal Law § 503-a(4).270  This law gives municipalities 
the power to, inter alia, “dedicate, sell, convey, lease, grant or 
otherwise transfer any of its right, title and interest in any property, 
real or personal, to such agency, or grant easements, licenses or 
privileges therein to such agency” for the purpose of urban renewal.271  
The Comptroller reasoned that municipalities retained the authority to 
alienate parkland for purposes of urban renewal because the law did 
not expressly limit its application to parkland and instead permitted 
alienation of any property.272  The Comptroller’s decision ultimately 
influenced the New York State Appellate Division.273  This was the 
first instance where parkland was alienated pursuant to this municipal 
law. 
It is likely that General Municipal Law § 503-a(4), if utilized 
properly, could allow the alienation of Willets West for development.  
Many New Yorkers disagree with the Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Matter of Avella v. City of New York;274 however, their discontent 
should be directed to the approach taken by New York City and the 
Queens Development Group, LLC.  In Avella, the City accepted 
Queens Development Group, LLC’s proposal to develop Willets West, 
which was expressly classified as parkland, but the state legislature 
only granted New York City permission to lease it to the New York 
Mets—it is currently used as a parking lot.275  The proposal also 
included development of lands adjacent to Willets West, known as 
Willets Point, which was not designated as parkland, but is blighted 
and in desperate need of development.276  The City did not seek 
legislative approval, nor did it attempt to utilize Article 15 § 503-a(4).  
When Senator Avella filed suit, he claimed that legislative approval 
was not necessary because the area was previously leased to the 
 
270 Id. 
271 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 502(3) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added). 
272 Vill. Green Realty Corp., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28.  In contrast, while N.Y. REAL PROP. 
TAX LAW § 995 indicates that when a municipal corporation which owns real estate 
“determines that the value thereof is insufficient to justify payment of the tax or special 
assessment levied thereon, in lieu of payment it may consent to an order directing sale of the 
property at public auction . . . to satisfy the claim,” the Appellate Division has held that this 
statute is limited only to property not dedicated to public use.  In re AJM Capital II, LLC v. 
Inc. Vill. of Muttontown, 14 N.Y.S.3d 476, 477-78 (App. Div. 2015). 
273 Vill. Green Realty Corp., 466 N.Y.S.2d at 27. 
274 In re Avella v. N.Y.C., 80 N.E.3d 982 (N.Y. 2017). 
275 Id. at 984. 
276 Id. 
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Mets.277  The court correctly and ultimately ruled that the development 
on Willets West required legislative approval, barring Queens 
Development Group, LLC from proceeding with development on that 
site.278  This decision does not mean that Willets West and Willets 
Point cannot be developed; it simply means that the developer can 
proceed with the project on Willets Point and must secure legislative 
approval to proceed with construction on Willets West.  Moreover, the 
court stated “that the remediation of Willets Point is a laudable goal,” 
and one that has the support of New York’s citizens. 279  Accordingly, 
it is likely that the development would be approved with ease should it 
be brought before the legislature as should have been done initially. 
Overall, New York’s doctrine is not overly burdensome to 
riparian landowners and developers as many may believe.  For 
example, New York’s navigability test requires that a body of water be 
able to support substantial and permanent commerce to receive 
protection if it is not tidal.  Therefore, bodies of water that are nontidal 
and not able to support substantial and permanent commerce may be 
subject to private ownership and the public can be completely barred 
from using them.  However, even if a body of water is subject to the 
doctrine, unlike in New Jersey, the public has yet to be given any rights 
to cross over private property to access the water or the land up to the 
high water mark.  Also, while New York has a substantial amount of 
parkland protected by the doctrine, it can still be alienated for 
development as long as the plan can fall under the state’s general 
municipal law’s urban renewal section.  If the project does not fit 
within the urban renewal requirements, a developer can still seek 
legislative approval which will likely be granted if the undertaking is 
one which the public wants because the legislature is the voice of the 
people.  Accordingly, New York’s doctrine is actually very pro-
riparian landowner and does not unduly burden real estate developers 
from developing land that is trust res. 
X. CONCLUSION 
While New York’s public trust doctrine strongly protects 
parkland, the courts should begin to exercise judicial discretion over 
whether the classification and protection of certain parcels of land as 
 
277 Id. at 986. 
278 Id. at 991. 
279 In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 991. 
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parkland are correct.  This will give local governments the ability to 
alienate property to be used and enjoyed rather than being overgrown 
and rendered inaccessible to the public such as the hundreds of acres 
of unused land in Nassau County, New York.  New York should also 
adopt New Jersey’s Matthews factors to expand the public’s limited 
access to beaches and areas otherwise preserved and held open to the 
public under the doctrine.  Last, the doctrine should not be a 
mechanism to fight pollution in general; however, it should be utilized 
to prevent trust property from being contaminated by identifiable 
polluters when such pollution diminishes the public’s enjoyment of 
that property.  If New York made these changes, it would likely have 
a doctrine that is more effective and beneficial to the public, and could 
serve as an excellent and workable model for other states. 
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